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THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
REGULATION FOR GOVERNMENTS ON THE
POLITICAL LEFT:
A COMPARISON OF BRAZILIAN AND UNITED
STATES PROMISES AND ACTIONS

Colin Crawford*
Solange Teles da Silva**

Kevin Morris***

INTRODUCTION

At the December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference
in Copenhagen, as is now well known, the parties failed to agree on any
detailed course of action, much less enter into a binding agreement to
control carbon emissions. However, four developing countries, Brazil,
China, India and South Africa, formed a working group now known as
"BASIC," and promised to try and resolve at least one key sticking point.
Specifically, the BASIC countries brokered an accord with the United
States under which both developing and more developed nations would
later submit carbon emissions target cuts.'
On a more personal level, much was expected of U.S. President Ba*

Professor and Co-Director, Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan

Growth, Georgia State University College of Law (Atlanta, USA). Professor Crawford's
contribution to this essay could not have been possible without the excellent research assistance of Kevin Morris, Georgia State University College of Law Class of 2010.
** Environmental Law Professor at State University of Amazonas (Manaus, Brazil)
and at Mackenzie University (Sdo Paulo. Brazil). International Director of a Lawyers for
a Green Planet Institute (Brazil).
*** Georgia State University College of Law, Class of 2010 salutatorian. Clerk to
Georgia Superior Court Judge Cindy Morris, 2010-2011.
1 See, e.g., Jason Groves & David Derbyshire, Climate Change Summit Accepts
"Toothless" US-Backed Agreement-But Deal is Not Legally Binding, MAILONLINE,
Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/art-icle1236659/Copenhagen-climate-change-conference-World-leaders-reach-Copenhagenagreement--officials-admit-enough.html (last visited, Mar. 25, 2010).
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rack Obama's presence at the conference, as many hoped that this signaled that the country, which had long been the world's single greatest
emitter of carbon dioxide, 2 was finally going to ante up to its responsibility to cut emissions. 3 In the end, however, Obama and the U.S. position
disappointed most. Brazil's leading newspaper, for example, indicated
that Obama's inability to provide strong leadership on the issue was a
"failure and disappointment." 4 By contrast, Brazilian President Luis Inaicio Lula da Silva was perhaps the greatest star of the Copenhagen conference, acknowledging the need to establish an agreement based upon
the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities." 5 President
Lula outlined a bold position defending targets for cutting greenhouse
gas emissions in Brazil from 36.10% to 38.9% by 2020, as well as assum-

ing that the country could finance part of the agreement. 6 The differenc2

That dubious honor is now held by China. See JANE A.

LEGGETT, JEFFREY LOGAN

& ANNA MACKEY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHINA'S GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND MITIGATION POLICIES 8 (2008).

3 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Obama To Go To Copenhagen with Emissions
Target,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
25,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26climate.html (last visited, March 25,
2010); Obama To Attend Climate Change Summit, CNN.coM, Nov. 25, 2009, available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/25/obamacopenhagenclimate/index.html
(last visited, March 25, 2010).
4 Chico de Goes, Deborah Berlinck & Roberto Jansen, Fracasso e decepqdo:
Lideres mundiais deixam Copenhague sem conseguir acordoforte para o clima (Failure
and disappointment: World leaders leave Copenhagen without achieving strong climate
agreement), 0 GLOBO (Brazil), Dec. 19, 2009, at 39.
5 In a speech at the Copenhagen conference, the 15th session of the Conference of
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-15), on December 18th 2009, President Lula affirmed that
"[d]eveloped countries must put their money on the table because of the greenhouse gases they have emitted for two centuries, allowing them to industrialize before the developing world. The COP-15 should not be negotiations between the
haves and have nots... rather these negotiations are about constructing sustainable
opportunities for everyone around the world."
Discurso Durante Sessdo Plendria de Debate Informal na Conferencia das Partes da
Convengdo das Nagbes Unidas sobre Mudanga do Clima- COP-15 (Speech During
Informal Plenary Debate at the Conference of Parties of the UN Convention on Climate
Change
COP-15,
AMBIENTE
BRASIL,
available
at
http://cop.ambientebrasil.com.br/2009/12/20/discurso-do-presidente-luiz-inacio-lula-dasilva/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
6 Even if one acknowledges that Lula's position was progressive and bold in an international forum, it should be observed that his government's decisions concerning environmental matters continue to be cautious. For example, while speaking at COP 15 for the
th
climate change, the Brazilian House of Deputies passed Bill 12 of 2003 (December 16,
2009) regulating the powers of each entity of government - federal, state and local - to
license, monitor and punish ottenses against the environment, The Ministry ot the Lnvironment and its partner agencies believe that such legislation, if enacted as is by the Brazilian Senate, will encourage deforestation and the destruction of biomes such as the
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es in the presentation and reception of these two leaders and their countries in climate change negotiations, both before and after Copenhagen,
prompts us to ask: do appearance and rhetoric match reality?
On the face of it, the leaders themselves share much in common.
They are both politically progressive leaders with appealing life stories
who were elected on platforms promising vast social and economic
change, including new environmental commitments. Thus, a comparison
of their individual rhetoric and actions-and that of their respective governments-on climate change may help illuminate some of the challenges facing the effort to take concerted global action on climate
change.
Under the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention
("UNFCCC"), "climate change" is defined as "a change of climate which
is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods." 7 As the
UNFCCC definition alludes, the phenomenon of global climate change
has exposed the basis of modern economic and social developmenthuman consumption of and dependence on fossil-based energy. Reflection on the phenomenon of climate change thus forces us to think about
the interdependent relations between human societies and their environment, and will shape the way we balance economic and social development with environmental protection and natural resource management in
the future.
As noted above, in both Brazil and the United States, progressive
governments have been elected in recent years, beginning with the 2000
election of President "Lula," as he is known in Brazil , followed by the
2008 election of President Obama in the United States. 8 In terms of cliAmazon, since it removes the powers of the federal environmental agency (IBAMA) responsible for monitoring and punishing those responsible for projects whose environmental license was granted by state or municipal agencies. Eliane Oliveira & Catarina Alencastro, A Lei da Selva (The Law of the Jungle), 0 GLOBO (Brazil), Dec. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.jornaldaciencia.org.br/Detalhe.jsp?id=68010 (last visited, Mar.
25, 2010).
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No.
102-38,
1771 U.N.T.S.
107, available at http://unfccc.int resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last visited, Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter

UJNFCCC].

8 In Brazil, after 22 years of seeking election, the Workers Party ("Partidodos Trabalhadores", or "PT") finally witnessed the election of Luis Inficio Lula da Silva as Pres-
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mate change policy and action, any comparison between the two countries must, however, be undertaken with care and due respect for context.
That is, one must consider differences in stages of development between
the two countries, the different ecosystems which will be impacted by
national climate change policies, as well as differences in the structure
of, and inputs to, each nation's energy and transportation sectors. Differences in these factors will not only affect the amount of national carbon
emissions, but will also have a pronounced effect on the national policies
designed to address the issue. Nonetheless, it is a premise of this paper
that because both nations are federal republics led by democratically
elected progressive governments, a comparison of their policies may
provide some insight regarding the challenges facing implementation of
climate change policies even when a government is inclined-at least as
judged by its rhetoric and political orientation-to act aggressively to
curb carbon emissions and address the adaptation challenges presented
by our changing climate.
To begin, it is worth noting that both nations have signed and ratified the UNFCCC and so have agreed to adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures towards climate change mitigation 9 by limiting
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.' 0 In the language of sustainable
development, the nations have "common, but differentiated responsibilities." 1" The U.S. is classified as an Annex I Party including developed
ident of the Brazilian Federative Republic in 2002 for a mandate of 4 years (2003 -2006).
President Lula was reelected in 2006 for a second mandate (2007-2010). In the U.S.,
President Barack Obama was elected to a four-year term in November 2008, for the period 2009-2012.
9 Climate change mitigation
"comprises all human activities aimed at reducing the emissions or enhancing the
sinks of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.
Adaptation in the context of climate change refers to any adjustment that takes
place in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected impacts of
climate change, aimed at moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities."
Richard J.T. Klein, E. Lisa F. Schipper & Suraje Dessai, Integrating Mitigation and
Adaptation into Climate and Development Policy: Three Research Questions, 8 ENVTL.
Sci. & PoL'Y 579, 580 (2005). In this text we will take into account the policies mitigating the effects of climate change.
10See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.
11UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3(1); cf U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REv.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1 (Aug. 12,
1992) (adopting the notion of common, but differentiated responsibilities "to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity ot the Larth's ecosystem"). IFor an analysis ot
this phrase in the context of on-going climate change negotiations as well as the obstacles
facing its implementation, see generally Tuula Honkonen, The Principleof Common But
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states and countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a
market economy, and also as a developed state- Annex II Party- that
must assume its historical responsibility for GHG emissions, and also. 12
The Kyoto Protocol, a mechanism established to implement the goals of
the UNFCCC,13 establishes quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments for industrialized countries, but the U.S. has not ratified it.
Brazil, as a developing country, is classified as neither an Annex Part I
nor II country under the UNFCCC, but is nevertheless obliged to cooperate in order to address climate change effects. As a signatory to the
Kyoto Protocol, Brazil must (as must all parties to that convention) provide national inventories of anthropogenic emission data and "promote
and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic, and
other research"; formulate and implement regional and national programs
containing measures to mitigate climate change; "cooperate in preparing
for adaptation to the impacts of climate change" as well as promote and
cooperate in order to develop technologies, practices, and processes that
"control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases."' 4 Thus, although the country has no quantified obligations to reduce
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil is obliged to cooperate with
industrialized nations in achieving compliance with their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments.
In light of this background, the remainder of this paper will address
the following questions: is there a difference between the ways that the
progressive governments of Brazil and the U.S. are facing the climate
change issue, or do they instead approach the climate change challenge
similarly? Specifically, do differences with respect to economic development between the two nations necessitate variant approaches in grappling with the effects of climate change and tailoring policies to combat
those effects? Or can similarities in climate change policies nevertheless
be identified by virtue of the governance challenges these large, as well
DifferentiatedResponsibility in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations, 18 REV.

OF EUR. CMTY.

& INT'L ENVTL. L. 257 (2009).

12 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FACT SHEET:

UNFCCC EMISSIONS REPORTING 2 (2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/applicationlpdffact sheet unfccc emissions reporting.pdf
(last visited, Mar. 25, 2010).
13 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/items/2830.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
14 UJNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), (g).
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as geographically, ethnically, and economically diverse, nations face?
These are the questions that this paper will consider by comparing Brazilian and U.S. climate change plans and actions. Part I briefly examines
the causes and nature of the climate change problem, as well as the relation of both ecological and progressive political thinking to that problem.
Part II then examines the climate change policies-and priorities-of the
U.S. and Brazilian Governments. Finally, Part III concludes that the approaches of each Administration exhibit a similar narrative-the expression of lofty goals, the implementation of which is fundamentally plagued by a lack of urgency and the subservience of environmental issues
such as climate change to other, often economic, considerations.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROGRESSIVE POLITICS

Recent studies have confirmed that atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases ("GHGs")' 5 have risen considerably due to human activities.16 Emissions are attributable principally to two sources. On the one
hand, emissions of carbon dioxide ("CO 2") result from the burning of
fossil fuels (carbon, petroleum and natural gas) in thermoelectric plants
and other heavy industry (especially metallurgic, steelwork, and transportation industries), as well as emissions from domestic heating systems, deliberate setting of forest fires to clear land for other uses (such as
farming) as well as deforestation for timber harvesting. GHG emissions
also result from anthropogenic emissions of methane (CH 4) via decomposition of organic material related to landfills, animal farming, and rice
cultivation.' 7 Climate change results from the accumulation of these
GHGs in the Earth's atmosphere, which the UNFCCC definition quoted
15Greenhouse gases are so-named because they absorb and re-emit infrared radia-

tion emitted from the Earth's surface, thus warming the planet. GHGs include water vapor (H 2 0), carbon dioxide (C0 2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N20), ozone (03), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). U.S.
Energy Info. Admn, Energy and the Environment Explained: Greenhouse Gases, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/-energyexplained/index.cfm?page=environment about ghg
(last visited
Mar. 25, 2010).
16
See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, WORKING GROUP
I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE PCC 135-52 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc-wgl.unibe.ch/publications/wglar4/wgl-ar4.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). According to the IPCC report, "it is ex-

tremely likely that humans have exerted a substantial warming influence on climate." Id
at 131.
17 See, e.g., Harvey Augenbraun, Elaine Matthews & David Sarma, The Global Methane Cycle, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, available at
http://icp.giss.nasa.gov/education/methane/intro/cycle.html (last visited Iiebruary 20,
2010) (concluding that human activities are responsible for approximately seventy percent of global methane emissions).
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above asserts, is largely the result of human activity, including fossil fuel
burning, deforestation, livestock farming and other human-directed activities.
A. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
Both Brazil and the United States are parties to the UNFCCC and
are therefore obliged under that agreement to take measures to mitigate
climate change. After the election of Presidents Lula and Obama, based
on their rhetoric and campaign promises, 1 8 climate change policies and
actions should have been developed and adopted by both governments
respecting the international community's desire to mitigate effects of
climate change. Yet it merits remembering that the responsibilities of the
two states differ under the UNFCCC. As already indicated, the UNFCCC9
adopts the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities,"'1
which means that national mitigation efforts may take into account each
State's respective capabilities and different social and economic conditions. This principle has two elements: (1) it entitles all concerned states
to participate in international response measures to combat climate
change effects, and (2) it requires different commitments from the signatories, taking into account each state's historical contribution to the effects of climate change, mitigation capabilities,
social and economical
20
needs.
development
future
and
circumstances,
Under the applicable treaties, Brazil and the United States are required to do the following:
develop national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by source
and removal by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the

"See generally COLIGAQAO LULA PRESIDENTE, PROGRAMA DE GOVERNO 2002
(2002), available at http://www.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/programagoverno.pdf (last visited October 27, 2010) (outlining President Lula's environmental program design) [hereinafter COLIGAQAO]; Barack Obama & Joe Biden, New Energy for America (2008),
available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergymore (last visited Mar.
25, 2010) (outlining President Obama's climate change strategy).
19 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3(1). For a history of this principle with respect to
climate change dating back to the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio De Janeiro, see generally
Paul G. Harris, Common But DifferentiatedResponsibility: The Kyoto Protocal and United States Policy, 7N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27 (1999).
20

This principle "seeks to respond to concerns over the legitimacy, equity and effec-

tiveness of international environmental regimes." Honkonen, supra note 11, at 259.
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Montreal Protocol, 2' using comparable methodologies to be agreed
upon by the climate change Conference of the Parties;
0 create "[a] general description of steps taken or envisaged by the
Party to implement the Convention;" and include in their communication "[a]ny other information 22... relevant to the achievement of
the objective of the Convention;"
In 2004, Brazil submitted its National Communication, which included a national GHG emissions inventory using 1994 GHG emissions
data 23 and a catalog of steps the country was taking toward reducing
emissions. In contrast to other developed countries, where CO 2 emissions come primarily from the consumption of fossil fuels, in Brazil the
main causes of CO 2 emissions in 1994 were land-use changes and the forestry sector, which together accounted for 75% of emissions. Meanwhile, the energy sector in Brazil accounted for only 23% of the nation's
CO 2 emissions. 24 These differences remind us that climate change is not
simply a scientifically discernable phenomenon, but must be also understood as reflecting social, economic, political, and cultural processes.
B. The Link between Climate Change Commitments and Political
Ideology
Those committed to "green" ideas often "describe themselves as
'neither left nor right but in front' because they want to affirm their difference from other ideologies." 25 However, ecological thinking-or
21Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer annex A, Sept. 16,

1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. The Montreal Protocol is an international treaty that was designed to combat deterioration of the Earth's ozone layer, strictly
limiting the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals. For a history of
the Montreal Protocol and its remarkable success, see generally Elias Mossos, The Montreal Protocol and the Difficulty with InternationalChange, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK
J. 1 (2005).
22 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 12(1)(b), (c).
23 In July 2010, Brazil's Minister of Environment Carlos Minc announced that the
country will conduct a second inventory using 2004 GHG emissions data. Cf.
INVENTARIO BRASILEIRO DAS EMIsSOES E REMOCOES ANTROPOCAS DE GASES DE EFEITO
ESTUFAINFORMAOES GERAIS E VALORES PRELIMINARES (BRAZILIAN INVENTORY OF
EMISSIONS AND REMOVALS ANTHROPOGENIC GREENHOUSE GASES EMISSIONS - GENENRAL
PRELIMINARY
INFORMATION
AND
VALUES),
Nov.
30,
2009,

http://www.mct.gov.br/upd blob/0207/207624.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
24 AcAcIo CONSONI ET AL., BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

BRAZIL'S INITIAL NATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
87
(2004),
available
at

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/brazilncl
e.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
25 NEIL CARTER,

(2d ed. 2007).
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"ecologism"-arguably has more in common with progressive ideologies
that are
(1) critical of capitalism and [that] have sought to transform it and (2) believe that human nature can and should be changed to make us less individualistic and less materialistic, although [ecologism] has also drawn on reformist doctrines that seek to dilute the worst
aspects of the market, such as
26
welfare liberalism and social democracy.
Clearly, there is thus some overlap between ecologist and progressive
political ideology, particularly with respect to the second portion of the
ecologist creed stated above.
This point invites us to examine to what extent the progressive governments in Brazil and the U.S. are willing and or able to advocate ecologist thinking in their climate change policies. That is, in their climate
change policies, have the Lula and Obama Governments sought to integrate environmental considerations in relevant social and economic political policies, programs, and actions?
It must be acknowledged, of
course, that Lula and his Government have been in power since 2003,
while the Obama Administration only came into office in January 2009.
Nonetheless, it is still possible to compare each administration's climate
change mitigation platforms, policies, and actions.
II. BRAZIL AND THE US: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES (AND PROMISES)

We begin by looking at the promises and priorities of the two candidates' political campaigns, drawing particular attention to their policies
on environmental and energy sectors.
26 Id

at 79. Carter continues:

[t]hus ecologism stretches leftwards from just right of centre, but it does not reach
the far left because greens want to control the market rather than remove it and
their suspicion of the state means they reject any form of command economy. Ecologism goes no further to the right because sustainability is incompatible with an
unfettered market economy. Moreover, greater participatory democracy and decentralisation would be impossible in either a command economy, by definition, or in
a free market, where they would be curtailed by economic inequality and the capitalist dynamics of accumulation, competition and concentration. This approach
leads to a conclusion that is slightly broader than that of Dobson: yes, ecologism
does occupy broadly left-of-center territory, but it draws in a wider range of perspectives of anarchist-emancipatory framework.
Id
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A. Lula's Promises and Policies
While campaigning for President, Lula released his 73-page "2002
Government Program,, 27 which affirmed that the only way to achieve
economic development and reduce social inequalities was to adopt a
model of alternative development based on social reform and the democratization of state and social relations. 28 The Program therefore proposed a "soft" transition to a new way of sustainable growth with fiscal
responsibility and social compromise. The Program asserted that the
government would work for a new pattern of development with economic growth, social inclusion and environmental justice to guarantee to all a
just and equitable distribution of natural resources and their benefits, taking into account the rights of future generations. 29 Intergenerational equity is a concept premised on two fundamental observations: on the one
hand, the recognition that human life is "inseparable from environmental
conditions" and, on the other hand, "that human beings have the capacity
to alter the environment." 30 Lula's ambitious campaign program further
expressed a commitment to the improvement of environmental quality
based on three strategies: a) adoption of socio-environmental standards
for public policies; b) implementation of targets for socio-environmental
indicators of progress (including deforestation, hot spots, emission of
C0 2 and CFC, sewage and sanitary treatment, water supply, control of
pollution vectors, waste management, air quality, natural resources
access, energy consumption, clean technologies); and c) social control by
supra note 18.
Idat 3.
Id. at 14. The "rights of future generations" refers to the principle of "inter-

27 COLIGAQAO,
28
29

generational equity," a principle derived from the Preamble to the United Nation's 1948
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights," which declared that a "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948).
Expression of this same principle can be traced throughout the second half of the twentieth century. For example, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
proclaimed the principle of "a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations." United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration on the Human Environment,
princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972). Edith Weiss, surveying several
modern international declarations and covenants on human rights, noted that "[tjhese instruments reveal a fundamental belief in the dignity of all members of human society and
in an equality of rights that extends in time as well as space." Edith B. Weiss, Agora:
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J. INTl L. 190, 201 (1990) (emphasis added).
30 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 643 (Daniel
Bodansky et al., eds., 2007).
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societal participation, environmental education and information. The
document further asserted that the government would establish integrated
energy planning, including hydroelectric, oil and natural gas, carbon,
nuclear, alternative (e.g. aeolic, solar and biomass) sources, as well as
concentrate on energy efficiency, co-generation and distribution of generation sources. In addition, the Program posited sustainable development as the objective of national energy policies, and sought to ensure
sustainability by taking into account, and sought to optimize, the use of
locally available energy sources. 3' In connection with the goal of sustainability, the Program also committed Brazil to continue to provide incentives for the production and use of ethanol-an area in which Brazil has
32 -in light of the fuel's environmental and nalong distinguished itself
33
value.
tional economic
Four years later, during President Lula's re-election effort, the campaign issued a much-abbreviated campaign platform, "President Lula:
Government Program 2007-2010," grandly announced that during the
first period of Lula's Government, Brazil had entered into a phase of sustainable development. 34 This Program describes the nation's achievements as well as its potential in 38 topical areas, three of which are important for the current analysis. First, the document celebrates industrial
31

In Brazil, wind energy is one of the renewable forms of electric power that has

been receiving the largest portion of investments from the Incentive Program for Alternate Electric Power Sources (PROINFA), coordinated by the Mines and Energy Ministry,
but, "Solar power utilization brings long term benefits to the nation making possible the
development of remote regions where the cost of electric power by the conventional methods would be too high for an attractive financial return on the investment. In addition,
solar energy would contribute to regulate the energy during drought periods and thereby
diminishing the dependency on the crude oil market with a consequent decrease in polluting gas emissions into the atmosphere as established by the Kyoto Conference". ENIO
BUENO PEREIRA E ALI, ATLAS BRASILEIRO DE ENERGIA SOLAR (BRAZILIAN ATLAS OF

SOLAR ENERGY), avaiable at http://www.fc-solar.com/conceitos/atlas-solar-reduced.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
32 See, e.g., Joe A. Flores, Future International Trade Issues: Is Brazil the Solution
to World Energy Shortages through Ethanol Trade?, 16 INT'L TRADE L.J. 62 (2008) (tracing the history of Brazil's ethanol industry and initiatives, dating back to the 1970's);
Monte Reel, Brazil's Road to Energy Independence, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2006, available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/19/AR2006081900842.html (last visited March 25, 2010)
33 COLIGAAO, supra note 18.
34 Lula Presidente, Programa de Governo 2007/2010 (2006), available at
http://www.pt.org.br/portalpt/images/arquivos/plano governo.pdf. Note that the 2006
report is less than half the length of the 2002 report (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
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policies that aimed to simplify environmental legislation. Second, the
program asserts Brazil's promise as an energy power, 35 highlighting the
Lula Government's plan to built two hydroelectric dams on the Amazon-at Rio Madeira and Belo Monte36 -as well as the consolidation of
biofuel production 37-including ethanol, 38 biodiesel, 39 and H-Bio--thus
encouraging the exportation of biofuel technology to Latin America and
Africa.4 0 The plan also stresses the importance of developing energy efficiency programs and fomenting the adoption of more efficient automobile, engine, and household appliance technologies. Third and finally,
the Program touts the environmental successes of the first Lula Administration, which the Program maintains earned distinction through creating
and consolidating protected areas, reducing the annual deforestation rate
in the Amazon and other biomes, creating incentives for clean technologies, and promoting sustainable energy use.
At first glance, the environmental emphasis and successes of the
Lula Administration are obvious; however, a deeper look reveals that the
31 Jeb Blount, Brazil Expects Power Demand to Rise 7.4% and Is Ramping Up Hy-

dro and Thermal Projects, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 2341941.
36 See Georgia 0. Carvalho, Environmental Resistance and the Politics of Energy
Development in the BrazilianAmazon, 15 J. ENV'T & DEV. 245 (2006); Philip M. Feamside, As Hidreledtricasde Belo Monte e Altamira (Babaquara)Como Fontes de Gases de
Efeito Estufa,
12 Novos
Cademos
NAEA
5 (2009),
available at
http://www.periodicos.ufpa.br/index.php/ncn/article/view/315/-501 (last visited Mar. 25,
2010).
37 See J.S. Clancy, Are Biofuels Pro-Poor?Assessing the Evidence. 20 EUR. J. DEV.
RES. 416 (2008).
38Luiz A. Martinelli & Solange Filoso, Expansion of SugarcaneEthanol Production
in Brazil: Environmental and Social Challenges, 18 EcoL. APPS. 885 (2008), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/brazil.mart-inelli.filoso. sugarcane.production.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
39 Solange Teles da Silva & Carolina Dutra, Brazilian Policy on Biodiesels: A Sound
Means of Mitigating Climate Change?, in CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 311-33 (Benjamin J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009).
40 Brazil has signed memorandums of understanding to advance cooperation on
ethanol fuel production and use with other nations in Latin America and Africa. See Paulo Sotero, Brazil as an Emerging Donor: Huge Potential and Growing Pains, WORLD
BANK
INST.:
DEV.
OUTREACH
(Feb.
2009),
available
at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/devoutreach/textonlyid526.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
For example, these memorandums have been signed with Belize, Costa Rica, Egypt and
Panama' (September 13, 2005), and with Guiana (September 12, 2005). The continued
emergence of the global ethanol and biofuel markets has created further participatory opportunities for Brazil, which are discussed in Gilmar Masiero & Heloisa Lopes, Etanol e
Biodiesel Como Recursos Lnergdticos Alternativos.'Perspectivasda Amdrica Latina e da
Asia,
51
REv.
BRAS.
POLIT.
INT.
60
(2008),
available
at
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v5ln2/v51n2a05.pdf (last visited Mar. 25. 2010).
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above asserted claims contain inherent contradictions. For example,
some of the areas most needing protection in Brazil are located in the
Amazon Basin, where the Government has aggressively pushed forward
plans to build hydroelectric plants 4' and invested billions in "Frigorific
Meat Companies", contributing to the advance of cattle ranching, in the
opposite side of the policy to combat deforestation.42Thus, it merits asking whether in fact the Government4 3 delivered on all of its promises with
respect to environmental concerns.
Indeed, the Lula Government has actually done much better on economic and social policies than in environmental matters. For example,
the government's record serving the poorest part of Brazilian population
through
its "Bolsa-Familia" Program44 is a clear46 success story in social
terms,4 5 as is the increase in the minimum wage.
By contrast, the envi-

41 See, e.g., Carvalho, supra note 3836; Tom Phillips, Brazil to Build Controversial
Bel Monte Hydroelectric Dam in Amazon Rainforest, GUARDIANCO.UK, Feb. 3, 2010,
available
at
http :/www. guardian, co.uk/environ-ment/2010/feb/02/brazil-amazon-

rainforest-hydroelectric-dam (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (highlighting dam opposition by
environmentalists and indigenous activists concerned about impacts on river ecology and
local populations).
42 See, Marta Salomon, BNDES ajudou a patrocinar desmatamento
da
Amazbnia, diz TCU (BNDES helped sponsor deforestation of the Amazon, says
TCU), 0
Estado de Sgo Paulo, Oct. 23, 2010, avalable at

http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/vidae,bndes-ajudou-a-patrocinar-

desmatamento-da-amazonia-diz-tcu,628829,0.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
43 Under the "Ten Years Expansion Plan for Energy 2008-2017", federal

government had plans to build 81 new units of thermal power plants by 2017,

with 68 of them are based on fossil fuels that produce greenhouse gases. The
New Ten Years Expansion Plan for Energy-20 19 attempted to correct deviations
of the previous plan and do not envisage any expansion of electricity with coal,
gas and fuel oil beyond 2013. But it seems that it's a plan of hydroelectricity: by
2019 it is planned to build about 30 million megawatt hydroelectric (including
Belo Monte). Supra note 43.
44Law No. 10.836, of 09 of January 2004. The program is designed to break "the
cycle of intergenerational transmission" of poverty through the direct transfer of income
to poor families in exchange for parental commitments to keep children in school and
take them for health checks-ups. Bolsa Familia: Changingthe Lives of Millions in Brazil,
THE
WORLD
BARK,
available
at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/BRAZILEXT
N/0,,contentMDK:21447054 pagePK:141137 piPK:141127 theSitePK:322341,00.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
45See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 44 ("[T]he Bolsa Familia Program may be the
[program] that is having the greatest impact on the lives of millions of low-income Bra-
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ronmental pillar of sustainable development has often been neglected by
the Lula government, which has been widely criticized for failing to consider environmental values and regarding environmental legislation as an
obstacle for economic development.4 7 In this sense, the greatest challenge of this left-of-center government is to take affirmative steps to implement the discourse of sustainable development. In particular, action
must be taken on energetic matrix choices in light of global climate
change and its effects in order to combat deforestation and preserve Brazilian ecosystems. It remains to be seen whether Lula's discourse and positions
at COP-15 represent an adjustment and transformation in this
48
way.

It is further important to observe that in 2007, as part of the Brazilian National Plan on Climate Change, 49 President Lula instituted the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change ("CIM" in its Portuguese
acronym), a body guiding the formulation of the national plan on all issues related to climate change in Brazil. 50 Some non-profit groups, howzilians.").
46 See The Most Popular Politician on Earth, NEWSWEEK.COM, Sept. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/215941 (last visited February 21, 2010) (noting that President Lula has increased the Brazilian minimum wage by sixty seven percent
since 2003).
47"The problem is that, in the core of the government, there's no agreement of environmental question as part of the strategic solution for the development of the Country.
Environment is treated like a problem that must be solved, like an obstacle". ("0
problema e que ndo existe, no nuicleo do governo, um entendimento de que a questdo
ambiental e parte de uma soluqdo estrategica para o desenvolvimento do Pais. 0 meio
ambiente e tratado como um problema a ser resolvido, como um empecilho".) See
Herton Escobar, Joo Paulo Capobianco: Ex-Secretdrio-Executivo do Ministirio do Meio
Ambiente (MMA), MOVIMENTO NOSSA SAO PAULO (Feb. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.nossasaopaulo.org.br/portal/node/2305 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
48 AMBIENTE BRASIL, supra note 5.
49 Pres. Decree no. 6263, of 21 of November 2007. The Plan was officially adopted
by the government in December 2008. Add Cite.
50 CIM is coordinated by the Office of the President of the Republic, and is composed of seventeen federal bodies and the Brazilian Climate Change Forum (FBMC)
(Presidential Decree no 6.263/2007). The FMBC is itself headed by the President of the
Republic and composed of several stakeholder members including Ministers of State,
Presidents of Regulatory Agencies, State Secretaries for the Environment, representatives
from the Business Sector, Civil Society, Universities and Non-Governmental Organizations (Presidential Decree no 3.515/2000). The federal bodies that belong to CIM are: the
Ministry of Agriculture and Supply, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of National Integration, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Cities, the Ministry of External
Relations, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the
Ministry ot Development, Industry and loreign Trade, the Ministry ot the Lnvironment,
the Ministry of Planning, the Budget and Planning, the Ministry of Transport, and the
Strategic Issues Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic.
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ever, have expressed disappointment at the delay in public consultation
about the Plan, and also for the setting of targets to reduce GHG emissions, which must be measurable, reportable and verifiable. 5' In fact, the
Plan established four strategic pillars: (i) reduction of GHG emissions,
(ii) adaptation to the effects of climate change, (iii) research and development, and (iv) dissemination and training. Some voluntary targets have
been adopted, such as the
"reduction of 40% in the average deforestation rate by 2006-2009 periods
in relation to the average rate of the ten years' reference period used in the
Amazon Fund (1996-2005). For each of the next two periods of52four years,
reach 30% of extra reduction, in relation to the previous period.",
The Plan recognizes that in order to achieve sustainable development,
further efforts must be made to reduce energy consumption through
energy efficiency and conservation measures. 53 The target of reduction
of GEEs of 36.10% and 38.9% by 2020, announced by the Brazilian delegation at COP-15, has become binding with Federal Law No. 12.187 of
December 29, 2009, that adopts the National Policy on Climate Change
(Politica Nacional sobre Mudanga do Clima - PNMC). Nevertheless, under this law, these targets are based on a voluntary approach and a federal decree must be adopted detailing all actions for achieving them. This
law also affirms that all governmental programs and policies must take
into account the principles, aims and mechanisms of the National Policy
of Climate Change. Based on the precautionary principle and a commitment to sustainable development, this policy has among its aims the reduction of GHG anthropomorphic emissions and also the preservation,
conservation, and recuperation of natural resources, particularly those
that are considered national heritage sites. 54 Furthermore, the National
51

See Sociedade Civil Quer Que o Governo Defina Metas de Reduqdo de Emissbes

de Gases de Efeito Estufa [Civil Society Wants the Government to Set Targetsfor Cutting
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases], SOCIOAMBIENTAL (Oct. 29, 2008, 11:30 AM), available at http://www.socioamb-iental.org/nsa/detalhe?id=2790 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
52 Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, Executive Summary: National
Plan on Climate Change, Gov'T OF BRAZ., 14 (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/208/-arquivos/nationalplan 208.pdf (last visited
Mar. 25, 2010).
53 For instance, the Plan seeks "a reduction in electricity consumption of around
100% in 2030... which can avoid emissions of 30 million tons of C02 the same year, in a
conservative estimate." Id at 8.
54 Under Brazil's Federal Constitution, "[t]he Brazilian Amazonian Forest, the Atlantic Forest, the Serra do Mar, the Pantanal Mato-Grossense, and the coastal zone are
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Fund of Climate Change" was also adopted, which establishes a mechanism for implementing this policy, and provides resources to support
projects or studies and financing of projects aimed at mitigating climate
change and adaptation to climate change and its effects. 56 However, it is
necessary to highlight that the Government has vetoed three articles of
National Policy on Climate Change Law: two of them concerning the
replacement of fossil fuels. The first one established as one of the policy's aims "to stimulate the development and use of clean technologies
and the gradual abandonment of the use of energy sources that use fossil
fuels." 57 The second one asserted how it would be provided a gradual
replacement of fossil fuels. 58
Even if these laws have already been adopted, more than rhetoric is
needed to integrate environmental concerns with other policies, particularly energy policies, which impact, for example, hydroelectric plant
construction in the Amazon Region, biofuels and nuclear energy, and
agriculture and cattle development. To put it bluntly, agribusiness in
particular continues to view environmental protection as an obstacle to
national economic development. The shared threat of climate change
may be the opportunity to begin to achieve such policy integration. To
date, however, the Lula Administration has not realized that goal.

part of the national patrimony." Constituicao Federal [C.F.] art. 225, par. 4 (Braz.).
55 Law no. 12.114, of December 9, 2009.
56 Under this federal law, the use of funds may be allocated to the following activities: I - education, training, and mobilization in the area of climate change; II - Science of
Climate Impact Analysis and Vulnerability; III - the adaptation of society and ecosystems
to the impacts of climate change; IV - projects to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases emissions; V - projects to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, with priority to natural areas threatened with destruction and strategies relevant to
biodiversity conservation; VI - development and dissemination of technology to mitigate
emissions of greenhouse gases; VII - the formulation of public policies for solving problems related to emission and mitigation of GHG emissions; VIII - research and creation
of systems and design methodologies and inventories that contribute to reducing net
emissions of greenhouse gases and reducing emissions from deforestation and changing
land use; IX - the development of products and services that contribute to the dynamics
of environmental conservation and stabilization of the concentration of greenhouse gases;
X - support for sustainable production chains; XI - payments for environmental services
to communities and individuals whose activities have contributed to carbon storage,
linked to other environmental services; XII - agroforestry systems that contribute to reduction of deforestation and carbon uptake by sinks and income generation; XIII - restoration of degraded areas and forest restoration, prioritizing areas of Legal Reserve and
Permanent Preservation Areas and priority areas for the generation and quality assurance
of environmental services. Id
57 Law no. 12.187, art.4, III, of December 29, 2009.
58
1d art. 10.
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B. Obama's Promises and Priorities
Shortly after his election in November 2008, then President-elect
Obama boldly announced that when it came to climate change regulation, "delay [was] no longer an option." 59 As was the case with Lula,
President Obama's designs for clean energy and climate change policy
reform were comprehensively laid out on the campaign trail. While
campaigning, Obama introduced his "New Energy for America" plan
an ambitious, integrated proposal that addressed "climate change, energy
generation, energy efficiency, oil and gas, alternative fuels and vehicles,
as well as clean air and clean water." 60 Taking note of the global "havoc" resulting from climate change, the plan expressed a commitment to
regulating GHG emissions through an economy-wide cap-and-trade system designed to drastically reduce carbon emissions by 2050.61 In addition, the plan emphasized the need for America to transition to a clean
energy economy. Beginning with the premise that America's energy
needs would be "best served through a sustained effort to diversify our
energy sources," 62 the plan called for at least 10% of all electricity used
in the U.S. to be "derived from clean, sustainable energy sources, like solar, wind and geothermal by 2012.63 Specifically in the area of alternative fuels, Obama's plan supported the development and integration of
biofuels,64including advanced biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biobutanol.
As made evident by the "New Energy for America" plan espoused
on the campaign trail, the new Administration's approach to the issue of
climate change consists of two broad initiatives: innovation and regulation. The development of advanced energy technology has already received an enormous boost from federal stimulus funding. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA") signed into law by the President on February 17, 2009, and designed to help the faltering U.S. econ59 John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18,

2008, available at 2008 WLNR 22057302.
60 Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America, OBAMA FOR AMERICA
(Aug.
3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet energyspeech_080308.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
61 id
62 Id
63 Id
64 Id
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omy, allocated $36.7 billion to the Department of Energy. 65 Among other things, the funds will be used to develop alternative fuel and energy
efficiency technology such as fuel-cells, advanced building systems,
commercial scale biorefinary projects, and industrial carbon capture applications. 66 As promising as this resource commitment may seem, however, it represents but a small fraction of the $787 billion ARRA stimulus
package, 67 to say nothing of the bank and financial institution
bailout that
68
occurred several months before passage of the ARRA.
In addition to funding technological development through ARRA,
the Obama Administration has also taken initiative to ensure that such
technology is deployed around the world in an effort to combat global
climate change. For instance, in August 2009 President Obama, along
with Mexican President Felipe Calder6n and Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper, reaffirmed his commitment to clean energy with the
North American Leaders' Declaration on Climate Change and Clean
Energy. 69 The Declaration sets out a general framework for action as the
region works towards "environmental cooperation, sustainable develop-70
ment, and clean energy research, development, and deployment."
Then, in November, the President announced a bilateral agreement with
China to tackle the issue of climate change through joint clean energy initiatives, the purpose being to7 secure "wide-spread renewable energy
deployment in both countries." '
In terms of climate change regulation, central to the Obama Administration's approach is a commitment to a market-based, cap-and-trade
65

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.

66

U.S. Dept. of Energy, Recovery and Reinvestment: DOE Recovery Act Funding,

115.

available at http://energy.gov/recovery/pillars.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (providing
a breakdown of ARRA DOE fund allocations).
67
Recovery.gov,
available
at
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/StateTotalsByAge
ncy.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (detailing total funds allocated under ARRA as well
as funds actually distributed).
68 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765, was signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008. EESA
created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which authorized the Department of
Treasury to purchase up to approximately $700 billion of troubled assets from financial
institutions.
69 Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, North American
Leaders' Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy (Aug. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-off-ice/North-American-Leaders-Declaration-onClimate-Change-and-Clean-Energy/(last
visited Mar.29, 2010).
70
.
71U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S.-China Energy Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), avail-

able at http://www.energy.gov/news2009/8292.htm (last visited Feb.27, 2010).
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system, 72 a commitment first announced on the campaign trail and to
which the President remained steadfast at the international Copenhagen
conference in December 2009. 73 A host of alternative energy and climate change-related measures have been introduced in Congress, the
most prominent among them the two cap and trade bills.74 The cap and
trade programs at the heart of both the American Clean Energy and Security Act ("ACESA"), introduced in the House, and the Clean Energy Jobs
and American Power Act ("CEJAPA"), introduced in the Senate, are
very similar in form. 75 Each bill would impose GHG emissions caps that
strengthen over time and allow regulated entities to trade emissions allowances. The Senate bill, however, sets a slightly stronger cap on 2020
emissions 76 and reserves more EPA authority to regulate GHGs under the
CAA. 77 ACESA passed the House in June 2009, though not without sig72

The White House, Issues: Energy & Environment, available at http://www.white-

house.gov/issues/energy-and-environment (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
73 See Juliet Eilperin, In Wake of Copenhagen, Obama's Next Challenge is Cap and
Trade, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 26, 2009, at 14A, available at 2009 WLNR 25982616
("Obama and his deputies have regarded international climate talks as a way to get the
sort of commitments from major emerging economies that would allow them to sell a
cap-and-trade bill to skeptical lawmakers back home.")
74 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), H.R. 2454,
111 th Cong. (2009), was introduced in the House by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA30) on
May 15, 2009. Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chairmen Waxman and Markey
Introduce "The American Clean Energy and Security Act", available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=comrncontent&view=article&id=1622 (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). On Sept. 30, 2009, Sen. John
Kerry (D-MA) introduced in the Senate the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act
(CEJAPA), S. 1733, 111lth Cong. (2009). Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, Kerry, Boxer Introduce Clean Energy Jobs and American
Power
Act
(Sept.
30,
2009),
available
at
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Majority.PressReleases (last visited
Aug. 20, 2010). Other related bills include the American Clean Energy Leadership Act,
S. 1462, 111th Cong. (2009), and the Solar Technology Roadmap Act, H.R. 3585, 111th
Cong. (2009).
75 See

U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY OFFICE

OF

ATMOSPHERIC

PROGRAMS, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 1733: THE CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN

POWER ACT OF 2009
(2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/EPAS1733_Analysis.pdf (last visited Feb 20, 2010) (comparing
the House and Senate bills).
76 CEJAPA, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009) sets the 2020 GHG emissions cap at
eighty percent of 2005 emissions while ACESA, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311(2009)
sets the 2020 GHG emissions cap at eighty-three percent of 2005 emissions.
77 ACESA, H.R. 2454, 111lth Cong. § 331 (2009). (ACESA expressly removes the
PAs authority to set performance standards for climate change related GHG emissions
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nificant political opposition. 78 CEJAPA, by contrast, was favorably reported by committee, but a vote in the Senate is not expected at least until the spring. 79 After Copenhagen, the domestic political climate in the
United States cooled somewhat towards climate change-once again. As
of this writing, it is difficult to predict whether climate change will draw
the attention it deserves from the U.S. Congress and Executive branch.80
But the introduction of a pared down energy bill in the Senate in July
2010, absent a cap and trade component, may have signaled the death
knell for comprehensive carbon legislation in the near future. 8 ' Political
opposition at this point is simply too staunch, and Senator majority leader Harry Reid appears to have pinned his hopes on wooing Republicans
with more modest energy legislation.8 2 Moreover, a recent declaration
by one of the Republican supporters of the Senate bill that "cap-andtrade is dead" 83 certainly does not bode well for an economy-wide system.
Though cap and trade was and, at least at this point, remains the
centerpiece of the Obama Administration's regulatory approach to climate change, other regulatory measures have also been advanced. For
from capped sources). CEJAPA contains no such language. See Sarah S. Brehm, Environmental Law, 57 LA. B. J. 261, 262 (Dec. 2009/Jan. 2010) (comparing ACESA and
CEJAPA).
78See, e.g., Peter Roff, Numbers Adding Up Against Obama's "Cap and Trade" Bill
in Senate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 7, 2009, available at
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/peter-roff/2009/07/07/numbers-adding-up-againstobamas-cap-and-trade-bill-in-the-senate.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
79Ben German, Kerry Says Copenhagen Key to Paving the Way for U.S. Law on
Emissions
Cuts,
TuE
HILL,
Dec.
16,
2009,
available
at
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/72627-kerry-says-copenhagen-key-to-us-law-onemission-cuts (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
80 See John M. Broder, Advocates of Climate Bill Scale Down Their Goals, N.Y.
TIMEs,
Jan.
27,
2010,
at
A4,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/science/earth/27climate.html (last visited Feb 21, 2010) (discussing the uncertain fate of cap and trade measures).
81Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Company Accountability Act of 2010, S.3663, 111lth
Cong. (2010). In response to the bill, President Obama stated that it is "an important step
in the right direction" but that he intends to "keep pushing for broader reform, including
climate legislation." Mark Clayton, Stripped Down Energy Bill Leaves Out "Cap and
Trade," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 27, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0727/Stripped-down-energy-bill-leaves-out-cap-and-trade
(last visited September 26, 2010).
82 See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 82; Timothy Gardner, Reid Hopeful for GOP Energy Votes after Elections, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 31, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67U52F20100831 ?feedType=RSS&feedName =
politicsNews&rpc=22&sp-rue (last visited September 26, 2010).
83 Juliet Lilperin & Steven Mutson, Senators to Propose Abandoning Cap-andTrade, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4119662 (quoting Sen.
Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)).
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instance, the President signed an executive order in October 2009 "to establish an integrated strategy towards sustainability in the Federal Government and to make reduction of greenhouse gas emissions a priority
for Federal agencies." 84 The executive order requires federal agencies to
develop sustainability plans, set GHG reduction targets, and reduce fleet
petroleum use. 85 This may seem a small measure, but the federal government is the largest energy consumer in the U.S. 86 Moreover, much
more significant GHG regulation could be on the horizon. The EPA
does not currently regulate GHG emissions with respect to climate
change, but that could change significantly under the Obama Administration. In December 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") issued its final finding that GHGs endanger public health and
welfare.87 This finding marks a radical departure from previous EPA
policy under the Bush and earlier Administrations, setting the stage for
future EPA regulation of GHGs under the Clean Air Act.88 Though the
President has expressed a preference for a legislative response to the issue of GHG emissions, 89 the endangerment finding does enable the EPA
to regulate emissions should Congress fail to pass a cap and trade bill.
With respect to the still-young Obama Administration, in short, it
84 Exec.

Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009).

85 id

86U.S. Dept. of Energy, Executive Order 13514 Signed on Federal Leadership in

Environmental,
Energy,
and
Economic
Performance,
available
at
http://www1 .eere.energy.gov/femp/news/news-detail.html?news-id = 15528 (last visited
February 27, 2010).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
88 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006). In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), that "[i]f EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean
Air Act requires the agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new
motor vehicles." Id.at 533. The EPA in 2007, under the Bush Administration, sought to
avoid regulation of carbon dioxide, citing a purported lack of authority. Id at 500. However, the Court rejected the EPA's claim and held that the "sweeping" language of the
Clean Air Act not only authorized carbon dioxide regulation, but required such regulation
in the event of a public endangerment finding. Id at 533. The EPA's December finding
thus paves the way for future carbon dioxide emissions regulation.
89 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Finds Greenhouse Gases Pose
Threat
to
Public
Health,
Welfare,
http /yosemite.epa.gov/opaladmpress.nsf/0/0EFi7DFi675805295D8525759B00566924 (last visited Iieb. 27, 2010) (noting
that both President Obama and EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson prefer a comprehensive
legislative response to GHG emissions).
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must be said that it has expressed laudable enthusiasm for climate change
regulation and initiatives. However, at this point, rhetoric has outpaced
political results. Though it is far too early to pass judgment on the Obama Administration's climate change legacy, a sober assessment of the
current situation reveals that the Administration has not yet executed the
level of change many expected after his election. The prospects of cap
and trade legislation, a centerpiece of Obama's climate change policy,
are uncertain and may be dwindling. Moreover, many were disappointed90
with the tepid results of the December 2009 Copenhagen Convention,
which concluded with nothing more than a non-binding international political agreement. 9' Already staunch domestic political opposition to Obama's progressive climate change agenda appears to have been galvanized by the Administration's plodding. 92 Despite the Administration's
conspicuous first year political struggles regarding climate change policy, it is important to bear in mind that billions of economic stimulus dollars have already been poured into alternative energy and energy conservation initiatives designed to spur technological development. These
efforts will in many cases require years of germination, but could in the
end yield the type of transformative results that political action has failed
to achieve.
III. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

As is now widely recognized, contemporary capitalism, built as it is
on the generalized free-exchange of goods and services, is an "energiyore" and thus constitutes the principal cause of anthropogenic carbon
emissions. 9' In light of that reality, this brief article has attempted to assist in understanding whether there is a difference between the ways that
the progressive administrations now governing in Brazil and the U.S. ap90See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin and Anthony Faiola, Climate Deal Falls Short of Key
Goals,
WASH.
POST,
Dec.
19,
2009,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/18/AR2009121800637.h
tml (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (noting the disappointment with the results of Copenhagen expressed by European officials, environmentalists, and even the President himself).
91 U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, COPENHAGEN AccORD,
Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/107.pdf (last
visited Mar. 29, 2010)
92For example, the January 2010 election of Republican Senator Scott Brown in
Massachusetts, who opposes a national cap and trade program, has been seen by some as
a rejection of the Administration's climate change policy. See Darren Samuelsohn,
Brown's Win Adds More Question Marks to Senate Cap-and-TradeDebate, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/01/20/20climatewiresen-elect-browns-win-adds-more-question-mark-48190.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
93

See,
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proach this issue, or whether they instead approach the climate change
challenge similarly. Specifically, we have sought to begin to understand
whether the government of a developed country like the United States
has acted differently in comparison to a nation in development like Brazil as to climate change effects and policies adopted to combat them only
because of differences in development, or whether similarities in climate
change policies can be identified by virtue of the governance challenges
these large, as well as geographically, ethnically and economically diverse, nations face.
It is our conclusion that despite differences between the two nations,
their records with respect to climate change mitigation activities are not
vastly different. Rhetoric notwithstanding, climate change goals and policy have been trumped by non-environmental interests. For example,
when the global financial crisis began in 2008, both administrations undertook to support the automobile industries. In Brazil, Federal ValueAdded Tax on Industrialized Goods on automobile were reduced to incentivize the purchase of cars and trucks. The indirect result, however,
would be an increase of future CO2 auto-emissions. Further evidence
that the environmental aspirations contained in President Lula's campaign literature have sometimes been relegated to secondary status
comes from the fact that various governmental initiatives to halt the
progress of deforestation, a primary cause of CO 2 emissions in Brazil,
have been pushed aside in favor of rural agribusiness under pressure
from the National Congress. 94 Recently, the Brazilian National Congress,
influenced by the agribusiness and agroenergy sectors, seeks to change
the legislation- defined in the Forest Code - legally sanctioning deforestation and undermining all efforts to protect the forest and to fight climate change. 95

94 See Steve Winter, The Amazon Gets Less and Less Green, TIME,

Jan. 25, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1707121,00.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
95 Brazil's forest code of 1965 requires all Brazilians to preserve native forest on private lands and establishes two types of protected areas: a) permanently
protected areas ("areas de preservagao permanente") (habitat along rivers, slopes
and hilltops) in rural and urban areas; b) legal forest reserve ("reserve legal") in
rural areas: landowners must preserve 20 percent of their property along the Atlantic Forest; 35 percent in savannahs and 80 percent in areas of forests in the
Legal Amazon. Of course,
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In the U.S., the threat of economic catastrophe spurred quick and
decisive action with the passage of the $700 million bank bailout and
nearly $800 million stimulus bill. The threat of environmental catastrophe that may result from global climate change, however, has engendered a far more restrained response. As noted above, only a relatively
small percentage of the stimulus funds were allocated to the development
of alternative energy to address emissions mitigation. In addition, the
Administration does not appear to have made climate change regulation a
major priority during its the first eighteen months. The President undertook an important step, at least symbolically, by attending the U.N. conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. At home, however, the prospects of economy wide cap and trade are growing bleak, and the EPA has
recently announced that it will delay GHG regulation of power plant
emissions under the Clean Air Act until at least January 201 1.96
Another important issue of central importance to each nation's climate change policy is the current focus on biofuels. The push for biofuels has dominated discussion of alternative energy in both countries,
even while the possible GHG effects of these "alternatives" remains unclear. Moreover, it must be remembered that despite the emphasis recently placed on biofuels, the economies in both countries continue to
run on a solid base of fossil fuels. To illustrate, when large reserves of
petroleum were recently identified off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, the

"these requirements were never enough to overcome the brute force of frontier economics". "Aldo Rebelo, a Communist Party deputy from the state of
Sao Paulo, has headed the reform effort. The commission's report would put
more power in the hands of state governments, allowing them to unilaterally
decrease the amount of habitat landowners must preserve to 50 percent in
the Amazon and 20 percent in the savannahs. Although Rebelo dropped
language that would have scaled back permanent protections along rivers,
the commission approved language that would provide amnesty to any and
all landowners who illegally cleared their land prior to 22 July 2008".
Jeff Tollefson, Proposal to scale back Brazilianforest code advances, July 6,
2010,
available
at
http://blogs.nature.com/news/thegreatbeyond/2010/07/proposaltoscaleback_
brazili.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). Now, the proposal will be voted by the
full Congress.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs 87-88,
available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd-me-mo-recon_032910.pdf; see also
Peter S. Glaser, Another Week, More Developments on EPA Regulation of GHGs,
MARTINDALE.COM,
Mar.
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2010,
available
at
http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/articleTroutman-Sanders96

LLP_944958.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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Brazilian Government sounded more like its North American counterpart
than a sustainability visionary when it vetoed portions of the law that
created the National Climate Change Policy suggesting that national fuel
needs preempted the strict observance of the climate change policy. In
addition, in the U.S., in March 2010, President Obama announced a plan
to open millions of acres of coastline along the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico,
and Alaska to offshore drilling. 97 The enormous scale of the announced
proposal signals a reversal of Obama's 2008 campaign position, which
originally rejected offshore drilling 98 but eventually expressed an openness to only limited offshore drilling. 99
In short, neither country's behavior demonstrates the kind of deep,
sustained commitment to alternative energy, sustainable practices, and
new consumer behaviors that must be exhibited if the threat of climate
change is to be adequately combated. The progressive administrations in
Brazil and the U.S. purport to recognize the scale and immediacy of the
climate change threat, and both nations have undertaken measures designed to combat that threat. The sense of urgency needed to respond effectively to the issue of climate change and other environmental issues,
however, has regularly been overcome by other considerations, often
economic in nature. As result, the actual remedial steps taken by both
administrations have in many instances deviated from the paths blazed
by their rhetoric.
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N.Y.
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98Ed Hornick & Alexander Marquardt, Obama Says Offshore Drilling Stance Nothing New, CNN.COM, Aug. 3, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/02/campaign.wrap/(last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (noting candidate Obama's shifting opposition to offshore drilling on the campaign trail).
99 Kent Garber, Obama Shows New Openness to Offshore Oil Drilling, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/campaign-2008/2008/08/04/obama-shows-new-openness-to-offshore-oildrilling.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).

